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The Illusion of Victory: Access to 
Abortion After June Medical Services 
Brittany L. Raposa, Esq.* 
“This is something central to a woman’s life, to her dignity. 
It’s a decision that she must make for herself.  And when 
government controls that decision for her, she’s being 
treated as less than a fully adult human responsible for her 
own choices.”1 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
INTRODUCTION 
A woman nervously walked into an abortion clinic on July 7, 
2020.  She took three trains and one bus to get there for a total of 
traveling 161 miles.  She had her entire savings in her pocket, 
wrapped up in an old envelope she found in her kitchen drawer. 
Nine hundred and sixteen dollars—the most money she had ever 
physically held.  She kept one hand in her pocket to keep the money 
safe and used the other hand to touch the necklace that lay across 
her neck, praying that it was enough.  This was the second clinic 
she was trying, because the one 72 miles away did not work out, as 
she remembers, “I was so uncomfortable. I wasn’t sure if it was 
because my skin is black or I was stared at like I was going to 
* Associate Director and Professor of Bar Support, Roger Williams
University School of Law. 
1. THE SUPREME COURT; Excerpts From Senate Hearing on the
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murder someone, but I had to run out of there and find somewhere 
where I felt safe and comfortable.”2 
She was at the clinic for five hours and she was not able to get 
an abortion.  She received an ultrasound and counseling that 
consisted of individuals attempting to convince her to keep the 
baby.  Although she stated that the conversation was a blur, she 
recalled phrases such as “killing,” “selfish,” and “promiscuous.”  She 
was told to come back in two days after she had the chance to think 
about their counseling.  Three more trains.  One more bus.  More 
money.  More stares of disappointment.  More shame.  She said she 
could only think of one thing months later: “If I have the right to 
my own body, why do they make it so hard for me to exercise it?”3 
We are currently in a time where women’s reproductive rights, 
choice, and equality are under attack.  Ignited by the Republican 
dominance of state legislatures and the pro-life movement, various 
states have begun to enact new and restrictive abortion 
regulations.4  This attack is clearly demonstrated by Louisiana’s 
enactment of Act 620.5  Indeed, Act 620 was identical to the law 
that was struck down three years prior in the Supreme Court case 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, where the Court declared a 
Texas law requiring physicians who perform abortion to have 
admitting privileges unconstitutional because admitting privileges 
are medically unnecessary and impose an undue burden on women 
seeking abortion care.6 
Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s 
Health, much legislation was passed in order to undermine abortion 
access.  Under the Trump administration, attacks on abortion 
access have reached their zenith, with anti-abortion activists and 
legislators emboldened by a Supreme Court that they believe will 
rule in their favor to completely minimize or diminish the right to 
2. Telephone Interview with anonymous (Sept. 3, 2020).
3. Id.
4. See Elizabeth Nash, A Surge in Bans on Abortion as Early as Six




5. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (2020); June Med. Servs.
L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112 (2020).
6. June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. at 2112; see Whole Woman’s Health
v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
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access an abortion.7  Attacks on abortion access have further 
increased since Justice Kavanagh joined Justice Gorsuch in 
molding the lean of the Supreme Court.8  In 2019, seventeen states 
enacted a total of 58 abortion restrictions—twenty-five of which 
would ban all or some abortions.9  Comparatively, states passed 
twenty-three restrictive laws on abortions in 2018.10 
States continued to enact restrictive abortion regulations, and 
the passage of Act 620 led to June Medical Services v. Russo.11  In 
June Medical Services, a plurality of the Supreme Court struck 
down the Louisiana law that would have thwarted abortion access 
to such a degree that it would have left thousands of women in 
Louisiana without a practical way of obtaining a safe and legal 
abortion.12  The Supreme Court found Act 620’s abortion 
restrictions unconstitutional, and pro-choice advocates saw this as 
a tremendous victory.13  Although it was a victory in that a woman’s 
right to choose was not overturned, it is not the ultimate victory.  
7. See Maggie Astor, Abortion Fight Evolves, Overshadowed in 2020 but




9. Olivia Cappello, Lizamarie Mohammed, Sophia Naide & Elizabeth
Nash, State Policy Trends 2019: A Wave of Abortion Bans, But Some States Are 




11. Id.; June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2112.
12. See June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2111, 2129.
13. E.g., Press Release, Statement: Supreme Court Rules in favor of
Abortion Providers in June Medical Services v. Russo, CTR. FOR REPROD. 
RIGHTS (June 29, 2020), https://reproductiverights.org/press-room/statement-
supreme-court-rules-favor-abortion-providers-june-medical-services-v-russo 
[perma.cc/32ZE-2T9Q]; Press Release, Planned Parenthood Statement on June 
Medical v. Russo Victory, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (June 29, 2020), 
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/planned-parenthood-rocky-
mountains/newsroom/planned-parenthood-statement-on-june-medical-
serivces-v-russo-victory [perma.cc/P825-7U9V]; Press Release, NARAL 
President Ilyse Hogue Comments on Supreme Court Decision in June Medical 
Services v. Russo, NARAL (June 29, 2020), 
https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/2020/06/29/naral-pro-choice-america-
responds-scotus-junemedical/ [perma.cc/L2HC-BTRB].  
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This Survey will first provide a brief history of abortion 
precedent to demonstrate the context in which June Medical 
Services was decided.  Next, this Survey will break down the June 
Medical Services decision, explaining both the plurality opinion and 
Chief Justice Roberts’ controlling concurrence.  Finally, this Survey 
will discuss the implications of the June Medical Services decision, 
analyzing how it is not an utmost victory, but is instead an 
illustration for the need for abortion reform.  
I. HOW DID WE GET HERE? A BRIEF ABORTION CASE HISTORY
The Constitutional right to an abortion, first recognized in Roe 
v. Wade, relies on a substantive due process framework that
emphasizes choice and individual privacy.  In Roe, the Supreme
Court held that the substantive due process right to privacy
encompasses a woman’s right to choose to terminate her
pregnancy.14  However, the Court specifically commented that this
right is not absolute, recognizing that states have valid interests in
protecting women’s health and potential human life.15  The Court
determined that states could regulate abortion for the purpose of
protecting women’s health only after the first trimester.16  The
Court reasoned that states’ interest in potential human life became
compelling after the point of fetal viability, which ample medical
evidence used in the case suggested could occur as early as twenty-
four weeks into a pregnancy.17  Therefore, the Court held that
states could regulate or ban abortion for the purpose of protecting
fetal life during the third trimester, “except when it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother.”18
Following Roe, the Court struck down many abortion 
restrictions under the trimester framework.19  However, pro-life 
14. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
15. Id. at 154, 162.
16. Id. at 163.
17. Id. at 160, 163.
18. Id. at 163–64.
19. For example, in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 
the Court struck down multiple provisions of an Akron, Ohio ordinance 
including provisions requiring that abortions be performed in hospitals after 
the first trimester, “informed-consent,” and a mandatory twenty-four-hour 
waiting period after signing a consent form.  462 U.S. 416, 422–24, 452 (1983).  
In striking down the ordinance, the Court rejected the medical and 
psychological claims made in support of the restrictions and noted that “safety 
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activists continued their efforts to disseminate the idea that 
abortion has negative psychological consequences and began to 
manufacture an evidentiary basis for this claim.20  Then, to pro-life 
activists’ content, there was an abrupt shift in the make-up of  more 
conservative justices at the Supreme Court, calling the future of 
Roe v. Wade and its legacy into question. 
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the Court upheld a 
Missouri statute prohibiting abortion and related research in public 
facilities, defining the beginning of life at the point of conception, 
and requiring physicians to test for fetal viability before performing 
an abortion twenty weeks or later into a woman’s pregnancy.21  In 
this plurality opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that Roe’s 
trimester framework had “proved unsound in principle and 
unworkable in practice.”22  To many, this undoubtedly appeared to 
be the beginning of overturning Roe. 
However, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe’s holding that “the
State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of
abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s
effective right to elect the procedure.”23  However, Roe’s trimester
framework was replaced with the new “undue burden” standard.24
Under the undue burden standard, states are permitted to pass pre-
viability abortion restrictions that promote their recognized
interest in protecting the health of the mother or protecting
potential life, so long as the restrictions do not impose an “undue
burden” on a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy.25
However, “a statute which, while furthering [a] valid state interest,
has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of
of second-trimester abortions had increased dramatically” since the Court 
decided Roe v. Wade.  Id. at 435–36. 
20. See Aziza Ahmed, Medical Evidence and Expertise in Abortion
Jurisprudence, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 85, 97–98 (2015). 
21. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 501, 522 (1989)
(plurality opinion). 
22. Id. at 518 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528, 546 (1985)). 
23. 505 U.S. 833, 845 (1992).
24. Id. at 874.
25. Id. at 877.
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serving its legitimate ends.”26  The Court further reasoned that any 
unnecessary health regulations that have a purpose or effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion 
impose an undue burden on the right to have one.27  Applying this 
new standard, the plurality in Casey upheld all but one of the 
challenged abortion restrictions—the spousal-notice requirement.28  
The plurality held that the requirement was an undue burden 
because, where spousal notification is required, it will operate as a 
substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to have an abortion.29 
In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court struck down a Nebraska law 
banning “partial birth abortions.”30  The Court held that the ban 
placed an undue burden on the substantive due process right to 
abortion because the statutory language was broad enough to also 
encompass the most common method of abortion after the first 
trimester.31 Further, the Court held that the law was 
unconstitutional due to its lack of a health exception.32  
In response to this decision, Congress passed a federal “partial 
birth abortion” ban, which used more specific language to describe 
the banned procedure but still omitted a health exception.33  The 
Supreme Court upheld this ban in Gonzales v. Carhart.34  Although 
it seemed contrary to their rationale in Stenberg, the Court declined 
to invalidate the statute for lacking a health exception on its face, 
but left open the possibility of an as-applied challenge.35  The Court 
agreed with the purpose that Congress set forth in its legislative 
findings, which the Court characterized as “express[ing] respect for 
26. Id.
27. Id. at 878.
28. Id. at 879–81, 887, 898–901 (upholding the medical emergency
definition, the informed consent requirement, parental consent requirement 
and the record keeping and reporting requirements, and invalidating the 
spousal-notification requirement). 
29. Id. at 895.
30. 530 U.S. 914, 921–22, 945–46 (2000).
31. Id. at 945–46.
32. Id. at 937.
33. Partial-Birth Abortion Plan Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2019).
34. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132–33 (2007).
35. See id. at 161–67.
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the dignity of human life” and “‘protecting the integrity and ethics 
of the medical profession.’”36 
Following the decision in Gonzales, there were multiple circuit 
splits throughout the country.  Courts were applying Casey’s undue 
burden standard differently.37  The Seventh and Ninth Circuits, 
along with many district courts, applied a balancing test 
“‘weigh[ing] the burdens against the state’s justification, [and] 
asking whether and to what extent the challenged regulation 
actually advances the state’s interests.  If a burden significantly 
exceeds what is necessary to advance the state’s interests, it is 
“undue,”’ which is to say unconstitutional.”38  When courts applied 
this approach, they considered evidence outside of the legislative 
record when analyzing the benefits of the regulation and the 
anticipated burdens imposed by the regulation.39 
Alternatively, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits did not 
apply such a balancing test.  Instead, when considering a challenge 
to abortion restrictions, the courts determined whether the 
restrictions satisfied rational-basis review, and then determined 
whether the restrictions had the purpose or effect of creating a 
substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion.40  Under this 
framework, abortion restrictions were upheld as long as they did 
not create a substantial obstacle and were rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.41 
36. Id. at 157 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731
(1997)). 
37. Gillian Metzger, Symposium: Hanging in the Balance, SCOTUSBLOG
(Jan. 6, 2016, 9:23 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/symposium-
hanging-in-the-balance/ [perma.cc/752P-M32Q].  
38. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 919–20 (7th
Cir. 2015) (quoting Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 
913 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
39. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786,
790–93 (7th Cir. 2013). 
40. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2324 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007)).  
In upholding the federal ban on the procedure, the Gonzales majority asserted 
that “[w]here [the legislature] has a rational basis to act, and it does not impose 
an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar certain 
procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests 
in regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, 
including life of the unborn.”  550 U.S. at 158. 
41. See id.
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Pro-life advocacy groups took advantage of these 
inconsistencies and began legislative advocacy with American 
United for Life (AUL), continuously focusing on minimizing a 
woman’s right to choose.42  The advocacy was centered on creating 
burdensome regulations for abortion, entitled Targeted Regulation 
of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws, which impose regulations on 
abortion providers that are difficult and expensive to comply with.43  
These laws typically increase the cost for abortion providers with 
the goal of creating widespread clinic closures.44  Although it is 
likely that the purpose of this legislation was to undermine 
abortion, the stated purpose was to “safeguard maternal health—
to protect pregnant women from dangerous providers and to ensure 
that abortion is performed in safe environments.”45  This prompted 
Texas’s passage of H.B. 2 in 2013, which instituted an admitting 
privilege requirement for abortion providers.46 
Texas’s admitting privileges requirement was first challenged 
by abortion clinics and providers in Planned Parenthood of Greater 
Texas Surgical Health Services v. Abbott.47  Although the district 
court preliminarily enjoined the admitting privileges requirement, 
the Fifth Circuit stayed the injunction.48  After the issue was fully 
tried, the district court permanently enjoined the admitting 
privileges provision because it found that it unduly burdened Texas 
women seeking an abortion.49  The Fifth Circuit then reversed the 
lower court’s decision and upheld the law as constitutional because 
it found that the plaintiffs could not show that abortion 
practitioners would be unable to comply with the requirement.50  
42. Cary Franklin, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and What It
Means to Protect Women, in REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES 223,
225 (Melissa Murray, Katherine Shaw & Reva B. Siegal eds., 2019). 
43. Id. at 226.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 227.
46. Id.
47. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott,
951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 895 (W.D. Tex. 2013). 
48. Id. at 909; Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs.
v. Abbott (Abbott I), 734 F.3d 406, 419 (5th Cir. 2013).  The plaintiffs also
challenged H.B. 2’s restrictions on medication abortions.  Abbott I at 409.
49. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 909.
50. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott
(Abbott II) , 748 F.3d 583, 587, 598 (5th Cir. 2014).  The plaintiffs did not file a 
petition for certiorari.  Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 
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During all of this time, nineteen of abortion clinics had closed: eight 
in anticipation of the admitting privileges requirement taking effect 
and eleven more on the day that the requirement officially took 
effect.51 
The Texas requirement was then again challenged, and the 
Fifth Circuit again applied the two-step, rational basis/substantial 
obstacle analysis, further finding that the restrictions were 
constitutional.52  The restriction was constitutional because it was 
“rationally related to a legitimate interest” in raising “the standard 
and quality of care for women seeking abortions and . . . protect[ing] 
the health and welfare of women seeking abortions.”53  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt.54  
A five-three majority reversed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, 
concluding that the Fifth Circuit’s application of the undue burden 
standard was incorrect because courts must “consider the burdens 
a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those 
laws confer.”55  The Court concluded that the admitting privileges 
provision was unconstitutional because evidence in the record 
indicated that many abortion doctors could not obtain privileges for 
many different reasons and half of Texas’s abortion clinics closed 
since the provision went into effect.56  The Court reasoned that 
these burdens, “when viewed in light of the virtual absence of any 
health benefit, lead us to conclude that the record adequately 
supports the district court’s ‘undue burden’ conclusion.”57  
The Whole Woman’s Health majority relied heavily on the 
district court’s findings of fact.  In comparison, the Casey plurality 
gave some deference to the findings of fact by the court of appeals 
(not the district court) on its broad construction of the Pennsylvania 
abortion statute’s definition of “medical emergency,” as well as 
some degree of deference to the district court judge in his 
2301 (2016).  Some of the plaintiffs, however, joined a separate challenge 
brought shortly after this decision was announced.  Id. 
51. Id. at 2312.
52. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 566, 598 (5th Cir. 2015).
53. Id. at 584.
54. Id., cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2015) (No. 15-274).
55. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016).
56. See id. at 2312.
57. Id. at 2313.
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determination of the effect of the spousal notification provision.58  
However, the plurality did not defer to the lower courts’ factual 
findings in making its assessment of the constitutionality of the 
informed consent, twenty-four-hour waiting period, or record 
keeping provisions.59  
In addition, the Whole Woman’s Health majority did not apply 
the Gonzales “undue burden plus” standard because it provided no 
deference to all the Texas legislature’s factual findings regarding 
the benefits to be derived from the admitting privileges 
provisions.60  By deferring to the district court’s findings of fact, 
rather than the Texas legislature’s, the Court’s application in Whole 
Woman’s Health of the undue burden standard took a step away 
from rational basis review and back toward Roe’s strict scrutiny, 
but without the benefit of clear default rules.61 
The Court stressed that under the applicable constitutional 
standards set forth in Casey and Whole Woman’s Health, 
“‘[u]necessary health regulations that have the purpose or effect of 
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion 
impose an undue burden on the right’” and are therefore 
constitutionally invalid.62  The Court stressed that this standard 
requires courts to independently review the legislative findings 
upon which an abortion-related statute rests to weigh the law’s 
“asserted benefits against the burdens” it imposes on abortion 
access.63  The Texas statute in Whole Woman’s Health required 
abortion providers to hold active admitting privileges at a hospital 
58. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98
(1992). 
59. Id. at 881–87, 900–01.  Note that the Casey plurality also referenced
several social science studies and concluded, “[t]his information [social science 
studies] and the District Court’s findings reinforce what common sense would 
suggest.  In well-functioning marriages, spouses discuss important intimate 
decisions such as whether to bear a child.  But there are millions of women in 
this country who are the victims of regular physical and psychological abuse at 
the hands of their husbands.  Should these women become pregnant, they may 
have very good reasons for not wishing to inform their husbands of their 
decision to obtain an abortion.”  Id. at 892–93. 
60. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310–11
(2016). 
61. See id.
62. Id. at 2300 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 878).
63. Id. at 2310 (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007)).
DOCUMENT6 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/24/2021  2:24 AM 
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within thirty miles of the place where they perform abortions.64  In 
Whole Woman’s Health, the Court found that the statute did not 
further the State’s asserted interest in protecting women’s health 
and that the conditions on admitting privileges served no “relevant 
credentialing function.” 65  The admitting privileges resulted in half 
of Texas’s abortion clinics closing and this closure placed a 
substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion.66  
Ultimately, that obstacle, “viewed in light of the virtual absence of 
any health benefit,” imposed an undue burden on abortion access 
in violation of the Constitution.67 
II. WHERE WE ARE: JUNE MEDICAL SERVICES
A. The Louisiana Legislation and its Impact
In June Medical Services, the Court considered the
constitutionality of Louisiana’s Act 620.  This Louisiana law 
required any doctor who performed abortions to hold “active 
admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not further than 
thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is performed or 
induced and that provides obstetrical or gynecological health care 
services.”68  Further, the statute defined “active admitting 
privileges” to mean that the doctor must be “a member in good 
standing” of the hospital’s “medical staff . . . with the ability to 
admit a patient and to provide diagnostic and surgical services to 
such patient.”69  Failure to comply with this statute could have led 
to fines of up to four thousand dollars per violation, license 
revocation, and civil liability.70  Act 620 was practically identical to 
H.B. 2, the law the Court struck down in Whole Woman’s Health.71  
Act 620 read as follows: “On the date the abortion is performed or 
induced, a physician performing or inducing an abortion shall . . . 
64. Id. at 2300 (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY ANN. CODE § 171.0031(a)
(2015)). 
65. Id. at 2311, 2313.
66. Id. at 2312.
67. Id. at 2313.
68. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (2016).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 40:1061.10(A)(1), § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(c); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:1061.29(C) (2016). 
71. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112 (2020)
(plurality opinion). 
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[h]ave active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not
further than thirty miles from the location at which the abortion is
performed or induced.”72  H.B. 2, on the other hand, read: “[a]
physician performing or inducing an abortion . . . must, on the date
the abortion is performed or induced, have active admitting
privileges at a hospital that: . . . is located not further than 30 miles
from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced.”73
A few weeks prior to when Act 620 was to take effect, three 
abortion clinics and two abortion healthcare providers filed a 
lawsuit, alleging that the law was unconstitutional because it 
imposed an undue burden on the right of their patients to obtain an 
abortion.74  The plaintiffs immediately requested that the district 
court  issue a temporary restraining order (TRO), followed by a 
preliminary injunction that would prevent the law from taking 
effect.75  In return, the State of Louisiana filed a response that 
opposed the plaintiff’s TRO request and requested that the Court 
hold a hearing on the preliminary injunction as soon as possible.76  
In granting the TRO, the district court allowed the Act to go into 
effect but ordered that the plaintiffs not be subject to the Act’s 
penalties or sanctions.77 
In June 2015, the district court held a six-day bench trial on 
the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction.78  Based on all 
of the evidence and testimony, the court issued a decision in 
January 2016 declaring Act 620 unconstitutional on its face and 
preliminarily enjoining its enforcement.79  In response, “[t]he State 
immediately asked the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to stay 
the District Court’s injunction.  The Court of Appeals granted that 
stay.”80  However, the Supreme Court issued a stay at the plaintiffs’ 
request, leaving the district court’s preliminary injunction 
temporarily in effect.81  Subsequently, in June 2016, the Supreme 
72. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a) (2016).
73. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY ANN. CODE § 171.0031(a)(1)(A) (2015).
74. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 158 F. Supp. 3d 473, 481, 486
(M.D. La. 2016). 
75. Id. at 481.
76. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2113–14.
77. Kliebert, 158 F. Supp.3d at 484.
78. Id. at 481.
79. Id. 482–83.
80. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2114.
81. Id.
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Court issued the decision in Whole Woman’s Health, reversing the 
Fifth Circuit’s judgment in that case.82 
Admitting privileges inhibit abortion access for a variety of 
reasons, which were alluded to in Whole Woman’s Health.  First, it 
is important to note that admitting privileges are extremely 
difficult and nearly impossible for abortion providers to secure.83  
Many hospitals only grant admitting privileges to physicians who 
accept full faculty appointments—a category that abortion 
providers do not fall under.84  Second, some hospitals require 
physicians to admit a certain number of patients per year before 
granting admitting privileges.85  Consequently, because abortion is 
an inherently safe procedure, abortion providers are unlikely to 
admit a sufficient number of patients, as most women do not need 
hospitalization or emergency hospital care after the procedure.86  
Third, some hospitals only grant admissions privileges to 
physicians who live within a certain radius of the hospital, making 
it nearly impossible for abortion providers to obtain any privilege if 
they do not live in close proximity to hospitals.87  Finally, some 
hospitals adhere to religious directives that run in conflict with 
established medical standards.88  These hospitals, therefore, may 
refuse to grant privileges to abortion providers.89 
At the time the district court issued a permanent injunction 
against Act 620, there were only three clinics in the state that 
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Brief for Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 15, Whole Woman’s Health v. 




87. See Brief of Pub. Health Deans et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 17, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) 
(No. 15-274). 
88. See generally CATHOLICS FOR CHOICE, Is Your Health Care




89. See Brief of Am. Pub. Health Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 15, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) 
(No. 15-274). 
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provided abortion services.90  The district court determined that if 
the law went into effect, it would reduce the number of open clinics 
and physicians to only one, which would make it nearly impossible 
for women in Louisiana and women in surrounding states to access 
the reproductive health care they need.91   
June Medical Services, the abortion provider that brought the 
case, claimed that Act 620 violated the constitutional rights of 
women in Louisiana because the law imposed significant burdens 
on abortion access without providing any benefit to women’s health 
or safety.  In their petition for certiorari, June Medical Services 
averred the following:  
In Whole Woman’s Health . . . [the] Court held that a state 
law requiring physicians who perform abortions to have 
admitting privileges at a local hospital was 
unconstitutional because it imposed an undue burden on 
women seeking abortions.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit upheld an admitting privileges law in 
Louisiana that is identical to the one the court struck 
down.92  
Therefore, June Medical Services asserted, the issue was 
“[w]hether the Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding Louisiana’s law 
requiring physicians who perform abortions to have admitting 
privileges at a local hospital conflicts with [the] Court’s binding 
precedent in Whole Woman’s Health.”93  Louisiana maintained that 
Act 620 was constitutional and that Whole Woman’s Health was 
distinguishable from the controversy before the Court.94  
B. The District Court’s Findings
The district court found that Louisiana Act 620 does not
advance health or safety or ensure that physicians are competent 
to provide abortion care.  According to the district court, the 
admitting privileges law would have “reduce[d] the number of 
90. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d 27, 35–36
(M.D. La. 2017). 
91. See id. at 80.
92. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo,
140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (No. 18-1323). 
93. Id.
94. See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at 2, June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v.
Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (No. 18-1323). 
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clinics from three to ‘one, or at most two’ and the number of 
physicians providing abortions from five to ‘one, or at most two’ and 
‘therefore cripple[d] women’s ability to have an abortion in 
Louisiana.”95  Although the state claimed that the law was intended 
to ensure that physicians providing abortions had proper 
credentials, thereby protecting women’s health, the district court 
concluded that the burden on abortion access severely outweighed 
the limited benefits that the law achieved.96  Accordingly, the 
district court enjoined Louisiana from implementing the admitting 
privileges requirement on the ground that it unconstitutionally 
imposed an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to an abortion.97 
First, the district court specifically found that the admitting 
privileges requirement served no “relevant credentialing 
function.”98  Hospitals can, and do, deny admitting privileges for 
reasons unrelated to a doctor’s ability to safely perform abortions, 
and a requirement that doctors obtain privileges at a hospital 
within thirty miles of the place where they perform abortions 
simply further constrains physicians for reasons that have nothing 
to do with their competence.99  Further, although competency is a 
factor in credentialing decisions, hospitals’ primary focus on 
credentials has to do with whether a doctor can perform hospital-
based procedures and not outpatient abortions.100 
Second, the district court found that the admitting privileges 
requirement “does not conform to prevailing medical standards and 
will not improve the safety of abortion in Louisiana.”101  Expert 
testimony in the case demonstrated that complications from 
surgical abortion are rare and also very rarely require emergency 
or hospital treatment, that the current transfer agreement is 
suitable for those who do need emergency care, and that the 
standard protocol when a patient experiences a complication is to 
send her to the nearest hospital, which is not a hospital within 
95. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020)
(plurality opinion) (quoting Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 87–88). 
96. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 70, 88–89.
97. Id. at 89–90.
98. Id. at 87 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct.
2292, 2313 (2016)). 
99. See id. at 50.
100. See id. at 44.
101. Id. at 64.
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thirty miles of the clinic.102  Further, the State introduced 
absolutely no evidence that demonstrated patients have better 
outcomes when doctors do have admitting privileges within thirty 
miles.103 
Therefore, due to the lack of a connection between the 
regulation and any notion of safety to women seeking an abortion, 
the district court held that the provision was unconstitutional.104 
However, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding discrepancies in facts 
from the district court.105  
C. Troubled Waters: The Fifth Circuit’s Decision
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court’s ruling.106  The Fifth Circuit’s decision in the case 
was terrifying for pro-choice advocates and many women, as it 
opened the possibility of a radical reorientation of abortion 
jurisprudence.  The circuit court conceded that it was “bound to 
apply [Whole Woman’s Health]” and weigh the benefits of Act 620 
against the burdens imposed, but it maintained that the facts of the 
case were “remarkably different” from Whole Woman’s Health.107  
According to the court, “[u]nlike Texas, Louisiana presents some 
evidence of a minimal benefit” and “far more detailed evidence of 
Act 620’s impact on access to abortion.”108  The circuit court 
reasoned that even though Louisiana’s Act 620 was identical to the 
Texas law, it would not impose a substantial burden on abortion 
access in Louisiana.109  The circuit court, based on its own fact 
finding, claimed that only one provider at one clinic would be unable 
to obtain admitting privileges, contrary to the district court’s 
finding that the law would force all but one provider at one clinic to 
stop providing abortion care.110  Indeed, the circuit court conducted 
102. Id. at 62, 65.
103. Id. at 64.
104. Id. at 87.
105. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 2018).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 791, 815.
108. Id. at 805.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 791.
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its own fact finding, which is a task traditionally reserved for the 
district courts.111 
Subsequently, the plaintiffs requested an emergency stay from 
the Supreme Court to prevent the law from going into effect while 
they appealed the decision, and the justices granted the stay by a 
five-four vote.112  However, Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent echoes an 
eerie warning for the future of abortion and a woman’s right to 
choose.  In his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh argued that there is no 
possible way of knowing whether Act 620 would impose an undue 
burden on abortion access if it was not allowed to go into effect.113  
He reasoned that the law’s forty-five-day implementation period 
meant that the “question could be readily and quickly answered 
without disturbing the status quo or causing harm to the parties or 
the affected women.”114  This wait-and-see approach completely 
ignores the law’s impact on women being forced to carry a 
pregnancy to term while the court waits, as illustrated in the 
statements of Louisiana providers and clinics who said that they 
would not be able to obtain admitting privileges and therefore 
would be forced to stop providing abortion care.115  At least one voice 
on the Supreme Court, then, is working to diminish Roe’s promise—
if there is no access to abortion, then there is absolutely no 
fundamental right to it.116 
111. See id.
112. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 139 S. Ct. 663, 663 (2019).
113. Id. at 663–64.
114. Id. at 664.
115. See id.
116. Justice Kavanagh’s 2017 dissent in the D.C. Circuit Court case Garza
v. Hargan further amplifies this voice.  See 874 F.3d 735, 752–56 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  Garza dealt with a young, pregnant woman
in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR); where ORR denied
the minor’s request for an abortion.  Id. at 744 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
Specially, the opinion dealt with the young woman’s petition for rehearing en
banc of an earlier decision where the circuit court directed that ORR be given
eleven days to find a supervisor to take custody of the minor.  Id. at 745.  In
his dissent, Justice Kavanaugh argued that the ORR should be given more
time to find a sponsor who would take the minor out of custody, which the office
had not successfully done in the preceding months.  See id. at 752–55
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).  This decision, which was ultimately overturned,
would have further delayed the minor’s ability to secure abortion care.  See id.
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D. The Supreme Court Opinion of June Medical Services v. Russo
On review, the Court considered whether the challenged
admitting privileges law was an undue burden on the right to a 
woman’s access to abortion.117  The Court applied the constitutional 
standards set forth in the earlier abortion cases, focusing on Casey 
and Whole Woman’s Health.118  The plurality noted that “a statute 
which, while furthering [a] valid state interest has the effect of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice 
cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate 
ends.”119  The plurality maintained that “[u]nnecessary health 
regulations impose an unconstitutional undue burden if they have 
the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a 
woman seeking an abortion.”120  In determining whether a 
challenged abortion restriction constitutes a substantial obstacle, 
“courts must consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access 
together with the benefits those laws confer.”121  This inquiry 
requires courts to review legislative fact finding “under a 
deferential standard,” but deference does not mean an abdication of 
the judicial role.122  Importantly, the plurality cautioned, “the 
courts ‘retai[n] an independent constitutional duty to review factual 
findings where constitutional rights are at stake.’”123 
In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court concluded that by 
presenting direct testimony from doctors who had been unable to 
secure privileges, and “plausible inferences to be drawn from the 
timing of the clinic closures” around the law’s effective date, the 
plaintiffs satisfied their burden to establish that the Texas 
admitting-privileges requirement caused the closure of the 
117. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112–13 (2019)
(plurality opinion).  The Court also considered whether the abortion providers, 
as opposed to patients, had standing to challenge the Louisiana law.  Id. at 
2117.  On that point, the plurality concluded that Louisiana had waived the 
standing argument and that “a long line of well-established precedents 
foreclose[d] [this] belated challenge to the plaintiffs’ standing.”  Id. at 2120. 
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2120 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct.
2292, 2309 (2016)). 
120. Id. (quoting Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309) (internal
quotations omitted). 
121. Id. (quoting Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2324).
122. See id. (quoting Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310).
123. Id. at 2120 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310).
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clinics.124  These inferences were further supported by submissions 
of amici in the medical profession.125  
In view of Whole Woman’s Health, Justice Breyer carefully 
weighed the purported benefits of Act 620 against the burdens that 
its enforcement would entail, concluding that the district court’s 
determination that Act 620 “would place substantial obstacles in 
the path of women seeking an abortion in Louisiana” was 
justified.126  Further, Justice Breyer concluded that the obstacle 
was high because it provided no significant health benefits.127 
The key findings the Court relied on are as follows: The district 
court supervised four doctors involved in June Medical Services for 
over a year and a half and those doctors were unable to obtain 
conforming admitting privileges from thirteen hospitals.128  In 
addition, some of the doctors’ applications were denied for reasons 
that had nothing to do with their ability to perform abortions 
safely.129  The cost of the applications was also high, and doctors in 
good faith then could not apply to every qualifying hospital, 
especially given the high risks of being denied.130  Further, the fact 
that hospital admissions for abortion are incredibly rare meant 
that, unless the hospitals also maintain active obstetrical practices, 
“abortion providers in Louisiana [were] unlikely to have any recent 
in-hospital experience.”131  Despite this fact, hospital experience 
was a precondition for many of the hospitals.132  
The evidence presented in the district court also demonstrated 
that many providers, even if they could initially obtain admitting 
privileges, would not be able to keep them because, unless they 
have a practice that requires regular in-hospital care, they will lose 
the privileges for failing to use them.133  Due to the safety of 
124. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2313 (2016).
125. See id. at 2312.
126. See June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2130 (plurality opinion).
127. See id. at 2132.
128. Id. at 2122.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2122–23.
131. Id. at 2123.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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abortion practices, it would be extremely difficult for any doctor to 
maintain admitting privileges.134  
Interestingly, the Court further relied on evidence that 
demonstrated that opposition to abortion played a significant role 
in some hospitals’ decisions to deny doctors’ admitting privileges.135  
Some hospitals prohibited a doctor with admitting privileges from 
performing abortions, and others were unwilling to extend 
privileges to abortion providers in their discretion.136  In addition, 
although abortion is legal, many abortion providers faced 
tremendous hostility in Louisiana, which, in turn, prevented them 
from obtaining the necessary admitting privileges.137 Many 
Louisiana hospitals required applicants to identify an alternative 
doctor who could serve as a backup should the doctor become 
unavailable, and opposition to abortion can prevent that physician 
from getting the required backup.138 
The Court stressed how the district court found that the law 
did not help to cure any “significant health-related problem.”139  The 
district court further found that the admitting privileges 
requirement did not protect women’s health and provided no 
significant health benefits, and made no improvement to women’s 
health compared to any prior law.140  The Supreme Court found that 
these findings were not clearly erroneous.141 
It is important to note that Louisiana has other TRAP laws in 
place apart from the admitting privileges provision, many of which 
impose barriers on patients and providers.  For example, Louisiana 
has laws banning abortion at or after twenty weeks post-
fertilization (twenty-two weeks after the last menstrual period), 
and banning the procedure used for abortions later in pregnancy, 
known as dilation and extraction.142  There are also laws that 
mandate a twenty-four-hour waiting period and requirements to 
receive an ultrasound and biased counseling, laws requiring 
134. See id. at 2123.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2124.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2130 (quoting June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp.
3d 27, 86 (M.D. La. 2017)). 
140. Id. at 2131.
141. Id.
142. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.1.2; id. § 1061.1.1; id. § 1061.28.
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parental involvement for minors, laws restricting public insurance 
coverage in line with the Hyde Amendment,143 and laws banning 
private insurance coverage for abortion care for plans in the state 
health exchange.144  Although the admitting privileges law was 
struck down, states like Louisiana are continuously implementing 
legislation that impose significant restrictions on women obtaining 
abortions.145  
E. The Irony: Chief Justice Roberts’ Concurrence
Chief Justice Roberts began by noting his views on abortion
rights, and stated that he “joined the dissent in Whole Woman’s 
Health and continues to believe that the case was wrongly 
decided.”146  However, he then explained that “[t]he legal doctrine 
of stare decisis requires [the Court], absent special circumstances, 
to treat the cases alike.”147  Chief Justice Roberts makes a powerful 
statement in his concurrence when he states that no one asked the 
Court “to reassess the constitutional validity” of Casey’s undue 
burden standard.148  Chief Justice Roberts applied Casey’s undue 
burden standard in June Medical Services, strengthening Casey’s 
force in the area of abortion regulation.149  Because the Louisiana 
law imposed “as severe” a burden on abortion access as did the 
Texas law invalidated in Whole Woman’s Health, the Chief Justice 
concluded that it “cannot stand under our precedents.”150 
According to Chief Justice Roberts, although the majority in 
Whole Woman’s Health “faithfully recit[ed]” Casey’s substantial 
obstacle standard,151 the decision to invalidate the Texas admitting 
privileges law also went beyond Casey to “require[ ] that courts 
143. The Hyde Amendment bars the use of federal funding of abortion
except to either (1) save the life of the woman, or (2) if the pregnancy was the 
result of rape or incest.  
144. Id. § 1061.17(B)(6); see id. § 1061.16; id. § 1061.10(D); id. § 1061.14(A);
id. § 1061.6; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1014(B). 
145. See Louisiana, CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, 
https://reproductiverights.org/state/louisiana#footnote3_92fi3n4 
[perma.cc/JXJ8-947F] (last visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
146. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2133 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
147. Id. at 2134.
148. See id. at 2135.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 2134, 2139.
151. Id. at 2135.
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consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together 
with the benefits those laws confer.”152  However, Chief Justice 
Roberts stresses that Casey did not suggest “that a weighing of costs 
and benefits of abortion regulation was a job for the courts.”153  He 
explained that if Casey required any consideration of the benefits of 
an abortion regulation, it was only in establishing “the threshold 
requirement that the State have a ‘legitimate purpose’ and that the 
law be ‘reasonably related to that goal.’”154 
Therefore, Whole Woman’s Health was precedent only to the 
extent that it reiterated Casey’s substantial obstacle standard.155  
On the contrary, the Court’s directive to reviewing courts to weigh 
the benefits of an abortion regulation against its burdens was, in 
Chief Justice Roberts’ view, an inaccurate portrayal of Casey’s 
holding and rationale.156  Therefore, if stare decisis dictated the 
outcome in June Medical Services, the precedent to be followed was 
not the full decision in Whole Woman’s Health, as the plurality 
maintained, but instead only those aspects of Whole Woman’s 
Health that reiterated the more specific and limited standard 
identified in Casey.157  
In addition, Chief Justice Roberts discussed how the Casey 
plurality considered only “whether there was a substantial burden, 
not whether benefits outweighed burdens,”158 including in its 
consideration of a twenty-four-hour waiting period that the lower 
court found “did not further the state interest in maternal 
health.”159  Consequently, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the 
premise of “Casey is clear: The several restrictions that did not 
impose a substantial obstacle were constitutional, while the 
152. Id. (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292,
2309 (2016)). 
153. Id. at 2136.
154. Id. at 2138 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 882 (1992)). 
155. See id. at 2139 (noting that Casey’s “substantial obstacle” test was a
sufficient basis for the decision in Whole Woman’s Health). 
156. See id. at 2136; see also id. at 2139 (“In neither [June Medical Services
nor Whole Woman’s Health], nor in Casey itself, was there call for consideration 
of a regulation’s benefits, and nothing in Casey commands such 
consideration.”). 
157. See id. at 2139.
158. Id. at 2137 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 822).
159. Id. at 2136 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 886).
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restriction that did impose a substantial obstacle was 
unconstitutional.”160 
Once he established the correct application of Casey, Chief 
Justice Roberts then turned to apply Casey to Act 620, determining 
whether it was an unconstitutional substantial obstacle.161  
Focusing on the district court’s findings that “the Louisiana law 
would ‘result in a drastic reduction in the number and geographic 
distribution of abortion providers’” and “longer waiting times for 
appointments, increased crowding and increased associated health 
risk,”162 Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the challenged law 
was an unconstitutional substantial obstacle in a woman’s way to 
an abortion.163 
Although Chief Justice relied on stare decisis to write his 
concurring opinion, he denounced the opinion of Whole Woman’s 
Health as it departed from Casey.  Chief Justice Roberts, then, 
followed binding precedent that he favored and abandoned 
precedent he did not.  In fact, the dissenting justices, Justice Alito 
and Justice Gorsuch, argued that Chief Justice Roberts’s 
characterization of Whole Woman’s Health was incorrect—a 
remade ruling inconsistent with the actual holding of the case.164  
Further, dissenting Justice Kavanagh observed that “five Members 
of the Court reject the Whole Woman’s Health cost-benefit 
standard.”165  Therefore, Chief Justice Roberts created the illusion 
of preserving precedent and instead created a precedent that 
agreed with the plurality, but upheld principles of the dissent and 
the conservative wing of the Supreme Court.  
III. WHERE WE ARE HEADED: ABORTION ACCESS AND THE UNDUE
BURDEN STANDARD 
Although June Medical Services v. Russo was a very slight 
victory, there is still a lot of work to do in the area of reproductive 
equality.  June Medical Services is seen as keeping access to 
160. Id. at 2138.
161. See id. at 2139.
162. Id. at 2140 (quoting June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp.
3d 27, 81, 87 (M.D. La. 2017)). 
163. Id. at 2142.
164. See id. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2180–81 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting). 
165. Id. at 2182 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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abortion open, but two questions remain: (1) whether the opinion 
set the stage for stricter abortion regulations, and (2) whether the 
opinion truly kept access to abortion open.  In short, June Medical 
Services definitely opened the possibility of stricter and potentially 
terrifying future abortion regulations.  Further, although June 
Medical Services did not completely close access to abortion, it did 
not create access for many women, either.  
A. The Curse of the Concurrence
Although this case was seen as opening access to abortion,
Chief Justice Roberts clarified that his concurrence only covers 
Louisiana’s admitting privileges law by endorsing Justice Samuel 
Alito’s dissenting opinion that “the validity of admitting privileges 
laws ‘depend[s] on numerous factors that differ from State to 
State.’”166  Rather than directly holding that admitting privileges 
are unconstitutional and are designed to shut down abortion clinics, 
Chief Justice Roberts will likely have the opposite impact.  Now 
anti-abortion politicians and advocates can strategically deploy 
admitting privileges laws.  There will undoubtedly be more laws 
and more challenges, but with the current makeup of the Supreme 
Court with the addition of Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the 
challenges now have a good chance at failing.  
In addition, Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion spent a 
great deal of time undermining Whole Woman’s Health.  As 
explained above, Chief Justice Roberts now wants to return to what 
he says is the correct analysis of the undue burden standard from 
Casey.  In his view, when considering an abortion restriction, courts 
should not balance burdens against benefits, but should instead 
only consider whether the law imposes a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a person seeking an abortion, and whether the restriction 
simply survives rational basis review.167  It is only if there is a 
substantial obstacle, or if the law somehow fails rational basis 
review, that then it will be invalidated.168  The issue lies in the fact 
that Chief Justice Roberts’ scope of what is a “substantial obstacle” 
is quite literally limited.  In Gonzales v. Carhart, he did not consider 
a nationwide ban on an abortion procedure with no exception for 
166. Id. at 2141 n.6 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting id. at 2157 (Alito,
J., dissenting)). 
167. Id. at 2136, 2139.
168. Id. at 2139.
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women’s health to be a substantial obstacle.169  Further, in Whole 
Woman’s Health, he did not believe the Texas law presented a 
substantial obstacle, despite half of the state’s abortion clinics 
closing as a result of the law.170  
Whole Woman’s Health served as a large point of clarification 
on abortion.  As lower courts were applying Casey’s standard 
differently, Whole Woman’s Health finally gave much needed 
clarity, only to have Chief Justice Roberts return us to the land of 
confusion.  This will likely increase abortion litigation where there 
is a high chance of unconstitutional abortion provisions being 
upheld due to the lower federal courts being filled with judges 
appointed by the Trump administration.171  
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts invited the possibility of 
overturning Roe and Casey when he specifically proclaimed that 
“[n]either party has asked [the Court] to reassess the constitutional 
validity of [the undue burden] standard.”172  Chief Justice Roberts 
makes clear that he only struck down the provision because he must 
follow the rule of law.173  Now, he is inviting a challenge to the 
undue burden standard.  In time, it raises the question of whether 
abortion will be outlawed all together.  
B. The Continued Existence of Reproductive Health Care Disparities
Both before and after June Medical Services, severe disparities
in reproductive health care and abortion exist.  Approximately 
twenty-seven cities in the United States are called “abortion 
deserts,” these are cities in which people have to travel at least one-
169. See Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 130, 132–33 (2007) (Chief
Justice Roberts joined the majority, which upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion 
Ban Act of 2003). 
170. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2330, 2346–
2350 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) (Chief Justice Roberts joined Justice Alito’s 
dissenting opinion, which argued that the Texas admitting privileges law did 
not create a substantial burden). 
171. See John Gramlich, How Trump compares with other recent presidents




172. June Med. Servs., 140 S. Ct. at 2135 (Roberts, C.J., concurring
opinion). 
173. See id. at 2133–42.
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hundred miles to reach an abortion provider.174  Further, more than 
eleven million women of reproductive age nationwide live more 
than an hour’s drive from an abortion provider.175  In addition, as 
of 2017, eighty-nine percent of counties in the United States have 
no known clinics that offer abortion care.176  
Women living in states with TRAP laws typically have less 
labor mobility—the ability to transition between jobs or from 
unemployment to employment—and women living in states with 
better access to reproductive health care, including abortion access, 
have higher earnings.177  Unfortunately, women who are denied an 
abortion face serious consequences, including the greater likelihood 
of living in poverty, staying in abusive relationships, and 
experiencing mental health issues, as well as increased chances of 
suffering health complications from continuing a pregnancy.178 
People of color who need access to abortion care, particularly 
black women, will experience the most harm with new and existing 
abortion restrictions.  Individuals of color disproportionately live in 
states affected by restrictive abortion bans and face discrimination 
and bias in the health care system that affects their ability to access 
quality care.179  Such bias and negative treatment contributes to 
174. Novel study identifies 27 large U.S. cities as “abortion deserts”,
ADVANCING NEW STANDARDS IN REPROD. HEALTH, 
https://www.ansirh.org/news/novel-study-identifies-27-large-us-cities-
%E2%80%9Cabortion-deserts%E2%80%9D [perma.cc/9VZU-RD8Q] (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2021). 
175. K.K. Rebecca Lai & Jugal K. Patel, For Millions of American Women,
Abortion Access Is Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/05/31/us/abortion-clinics-map.html 
[https://perma.cc/D5KG-GQ9F].  
176. Rachel K. Jones, Elizabeth Witwer & Jenna Jerman, Abortion
Incidence and Service Availability in the United States, 2017, GUTTMACHER 
INST. (Sept. 2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/report/abortion-incidence-
service-availability-us-2017# [https://perma.cc/2ZBL-Q7Q3].  
177. Kate Bahn, Adriana Kugler, Melissa Mahoney, Danielle Corley &
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poor health outcomes.180  For example, Black women in the United 
States are three to four times more likely than non-Hispanic white 
women to die from pregnancy-related causes.181  In addition to 
abortion disparities, women of color also face disparities across 
sexual and reproductive health outcomes, including maternal 
health, cervical and breast cancers, and sexually transmitted 
infections (STIs).182  Abortion restrictions will only further subject 
individuals to pregnancy-related health risks.  
In addition, abortion restrictions have a different impact on low 
income individuals.  In 2011, the rate of unintended pregnancy for 
women aged fifteen to forty-four was more than five times higher 
for women with incomes below the federal poverty level than it was 
for those with incomes at or above two-hundred percent of the 
poverty level.183  Women with low incomes are far more likely to 
have to drive farther distances to reach an abortion provider.184  
Financial factors, such as transportation, travel costs, the ability to 
take time off of work, child care costs, and the cost of the procedure 
itself creates impossible barriers to abortion care for low-income 
individuals.185  
Further, disparities are wide for transgender, non-binary, and 
gender-non-confirming individuals.  These individuals face unique 
barriers to accessing care, such as discrimination, bias, and lack of 
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mistreatment and poor quality of care create a fear and distrust of 
the reproductive health care system.187  The U.S. Transgender 
Survey found that twenty-three percent of respondents avoided 
going to the doctor out of fear of being mistreated.188  These groups 
already did not have a safe option for accessing abortion, and it may 
only be made worse by future restrictions to abortion access in these 
communities.  
Finally, many other groups face additional barriers to access, 
including immigrants, children, and disabled individuals.  All of 
these groups face discrimination, bias, and heightened scrutiny 
when it comes to reproductive health care in the United States.189  
However, as the other disparities discussed in this Survey, these 
disparities were neither addressed nor given any hope for the future 
in the Supreme Court June Medical Services opinion.  
The Supreme Court and legislators must focus on the impact 
regulations would have on groups whose access to abortion is 
especially vulnerable.  These groups consist of many women 
geographically located in the Midwest and the South, people of 
color, low-income people, people with disabilities, young people, and 
transgender and non-binary people.  As policymakers examine 
barriers to abortion access for marginalized groups, it is important 
to remember that many people identify with a multiple of these 
groups, which further amplifies the disparities and barriers they 
face in receiving abortion and reproductive healthcare.  
According to Casey, where we are strictly brought back to after 
the decision in June Medical Services, abortion regulations that 
have either “the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle 
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus” 
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violate the Constitution and its protection of women’s abortion 
rights.190  The focus, then, is whether the restriction places an 
“undue burden” on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion.191  
However, if the Court does not analyze the undue burden standard 
from the perspective of the most marginalized individuals in 
society, then there will never truly be proper access to abortion. 
June Medical Services did not address these issues of disparities, 
nor did it make them any more equal.  In fact, if it did anything, it 
opened the opportunity to create further disparities for individuals 
accessing abortion care.  
CONCLUSION 
Where we are headed from here is both uncertain and 
unsettling.  The fight for reproductive rights and justice must 
continue stronger than ever.  Voices on the Supreme Court have 
undoubtedly demonstrated a blatant disregard for precedent in 
order to further the attack on abortion rights.  Although the most 
extreme abortion restrictions have been blocked by the courts, 
many restrictive laws remain in effect across the country.192  The 
restrictive abortion bans currently in effect include bans on 
abortion at varying weeks of gestation, on certain methods of 
abortion procedures, or on abortions for particular reasons, such as 
fetal diagnosis.193  Further, there are restrictions in place such as 
mandatory waiting periods and ultrasounds, mandated counseling 
with biased and inaccurate information, parental involvement 
requirements for minors, and more.194  A recent study and analysis 
from the Center for Reproductive Rights found that if Roe v. Wade 
were significantly limited or overturned, abortion could potentially 
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become illegal in as many as twenty-four states.195  This analysis, 
in part, also found that many of these states are among the twenty-
four states that have TRAP laws in place, including regulations for 
facility structure and licensing, as well as requirements for abortion 
providers.  The restrictions and disparities continue.  
Unfortunately, the future of reproductive rights and 
reproductive justice is in jeopardy.  The Supreme Court must 
recognize and support both the right to abortion and access to 
abortion—which are not synonymous.  A decision that takes into 
account those who are most affected by abortion restrictions is 
absolutely necessary.  However, there is one thing that is certain: 
women cannot have a right to their own bodies if it is too difficult 
to exercise that right.  
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